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Drug policy constellations: a Habermasian approach for understanding English 
drug policy 
Abstract 
Background: It is increasingly accepted that a view of policy as a rational process of 
fitting evidence-based means to rationally justified ends is inadequate for 
understanding the actual processes of drug policy making. We aim to provide a better 
description and explanation of recent English drug policy decisions. 
Method: We develop the policy constellation concept from the work of Habermas, in 
dialogue with data from two contemporary debates in English policy; on 
decriminalisation of drug possession and on recovery in drug treatment. We collect data 
on these debates through long-term participant observation, stakeholder interviews (n 
= 15) and documentary analysis.  
Results: We show the importance of social asymmetries in power in enabling 
structurally advantaged groups to achieve the institutionalisation of their moral 
preferences as well as the reproduction of their social and economic power through the 
deployment of policies that reflect their material interests and normative beliefs. The 
most influential actors in English drug policy come together in a ‘medico-penal 
constellation’, in which the aims and practices of public health and social control 
overlap. Formal decriminalisation of possession has not occurred, despite the efforts of 
members of a challenging constellation which supports it. Recovery was put forward as 
the aim of drug treatment by members of a more powerfully connected constellation. It 
has been absorbed into the practice of ‘recovery-oriented’ drug treatment in a way that 
maintains the power of public health professionals to determine the form of treatment.  
Conclusion: Actors who share interests and norms come together in policy 
constellations. Strategic action within and between constellations creates policies that 
may not take the form that was intended by any individual actor. These policies do not 
result from purely rational deliberation, but are produced through ‘systematically 
distorted communication’. They enable the most structurally favoured actors to 
institutionalise their own normative preferences and structural positions. 
Keywords: policy constellations; English drug policy; decriminalisation; recovery; 
critical theory
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Introduction: the need for a critical theory of drug policy decisions 
 
To understand drug policy, we need to develop explanatory theories of how drug policy 
decisions are produced (Burris, 2016; Ritter, Livingston, Chalmers, Berends, & Reuter, 
2016; Stevens, 2011a). The policy studies literature has moved beyond thinking about 
policy in terms of sequences of rationally developed ‘stages’ (Cairney, 2011; Hill, 2009; 
Ritter & Bammer, 2010). Several authors have explored the inadequacy of the concept 
of rationally justified, ‘evidence-based policy’ for explaining drug policy decisions (e.g. 
Lancaster, 2014; Maccoun, 2010; Monaghan, 2008; Stevens, 2011b; Valentine, 2009). 
They draw our attention to the influence of power on the use of reason and evidence. 
The exercise of rational deliberation is also influenced by normative commitments to 
certain forms of morality (Haidt, 2012; Knill, 2014; Zampini, 2016) 
 
The works of Jürgen Habermas relates directly to this interplay between rationality, 
normativity and power (Flynn, 2004; Habermas, 1984, 1986, 2006). This article uses his 
ideas to describe and explain particular decisions in English drug policy. In doing so, it 
introduces a new concept to the field of drug policy studies: the ‘policy constellation’. 
This can take account of structurally distributed power differences and normative 
preferences in the production of continuity and change in English drug policy.  
 
The concept of the policy constellation builds on Habermas’ (1986, p. 241) idea that we 
can explain the outcome of legal processes ‘in terms of interest and power 
constellations’.  Habermas notes that public debates about legal provisions always rest 
on normative principles. Principles are multiple, and may come into conflict. As such, 
they undergo ‘discursive testing’ (1986: 227). On the basis of his theory of 
communicative action, Habermas (2002) proposes that rational communication is 
‘systematically distorted’ by strategic, purposive action. In distorting such rational 
deliberation, structurally favoured social actors can deploy their ‘social power’ 
(Habermas, 2006: 418). So laws which reflect moral principles held by more powerful 
people will prevail, even if they would not be justified through purely deliberative, 
rational communication. He argues that ‘the legitimacy of legality cannot be explained in 
terms of some independent rationality which, as it were, inhabits the form of law in a 
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morally neutral manner’ (Habermas, 1986: 228), as some advocates of rational, 
evidence-based policy would demand. Rather, he argues, ‘in the clash of value 
preferences incapable of further rationalization, the strongest interest will happen to be 
the one actually implemented’ (Habermas, 1986: 241). So values that reflect existing 
socio-economic and ideological power asymmetries and that coincide with dominant 
interests will heavily influence the development of laws and other forms of social 
regulation (e.g. drug policy).  
 
For Habermas, such values do not flow through impersonal, all-pervasive discourses of 
power, as suggested by some Foucauldian analysts (Schmidt, 1996). Rather, they can be 
attributed to human actors who occupy specified positions in the social structure and 
who engage in strategic action in pursuit of their goals. In these terms, a policy 
constellation is a set of social actors (individuals within organisations) who come 
together in deploying various forms of socially structured power to pursue the 
institutionalisation in policy of shared moral preferences and material interests. 
Constellations are not stable groups with fixed rules or memberships. They are made up 
of fluid sets of actors who gravitate towards each other on the basis of shared interests 
and norms. Their actions are not necessarily directed or coordinated. Rather, actors in a 
constellation tend to align their actions through creating connections of mutual 
recognition and support. They do so in contest and collaboration with the members of 
other constellations, who have different interests and norms (although there may be 
overlap between the memberships, interests and norms of some policy constellations).  
 
Constellations are not actors in themselves. Rather, the connections between actors that 
constitute the constellation serve to amplify the influence of each individual actor. The 
degree of amplification will depend on the power of other actors in the same 
constellation. Some constellations are made up of people who have relatively powerful 
positions in the social structure. In Gamson’s (1975) terms, they are ‘insiders’.  They can 
use various mechanisms – including ‘opportunity hoarding’ and other strategies 
described by Tilly (1998) as creating ‘durable inequalities’ – to reproduce their own 
positions and power. These resources and mechanisms are not available to challenging 
‘outsiders’ who ‘lack the basic prerequisite of membership - routine access to decisions 
that affect them’ (Gamson, 1975: 140).  
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In England, cleavages between insiders and outsiders often appear along axes of class, 
race, gender and age. The most powerful positions in state and other institutions are 
disproportionately held by privately educated, middle or upper class, middle-aged or 
older, white British men (Andrews & Ashworth, 2013; Kirby, 2016; Knights & Richards, 
2003; Rampen, 2017; Sampson, 2005; Social Mobility Commission, 2017). Their power 
rests not only on their abilities in rational, deliberative communication, but on the 
resources of power, money and connections that they have by virtue of their positions 
in the social structure. This is what Habermas (2006:418) calls ‘social power’. They 
engage in policy discussions that have the outward appearance of an ‘ideal speech 
situation’ (Habermas, 1984; Neale, Nettleton, & Pickering, 2011) in which consensus is 
reached through rational deliberation alone. But they are able to distort such 
deliberations through strategic action (Habermas, 2002; Stevens, 2011b) by deploying 
resources of power, including political, economic and media power (Habermas, 2006).  
 
These privileged actors have heavy influence on what kinds of evidence will be 
produced, disseminated and given the status of authoritative, legitimate knowledge 
(Hall, 1993; Blomkamp, 2014; Elgert, 2014). They have the capacity to shape policies 
that reflect their interests and norms. But – as noted by both Gamson (1975) and 
Habermas (1986) - there is not a homogeneous ‘ruling class’ that can simply direct 
policy. There are multiple constellations of interest and power in and around the state. 
Actors with competing interests and preferences have a diverse range of structural 
positions. It is from communicative and strategic action between these individuals that 
constellations and then policy decisions emerge. Their actions are influenced by – and 
go on to influence in future – the structural positions that these actors hold (Colebatch, 
2009; Giddens, 1984). This is an approach that enables analysis to incorporate the roles 
of both agency and structure in describing and explaining policy decisions. 
 
We will fill out our description of English drug policy constellations – of their 
membership, beliefs, and their types of strategic action – in dialogue with empirical 
data. These data will come from close examination of two decisions in the English drug 
policy process: the non-implementation of formal decriminalisation of drug possession; 
and the turn to ‘recovery’ in drug treatment. In studying these debates, we observed the 
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work of several organisations. As an aid to readers, we provide introductory 
information about these organisations in an appendix. In the text, these organisations 
are marked with an asterisk when they are first mentioned. 
 
In both debates, we observe the substantial influence of social actors who share moral 
and policy preferences that have been characterised by Berridge (2013) as constituting 
a ‘medico-penal framework’. She observes the development of this framework over the 
20th century history of English drug policy. Through this framework, she describes the 
overlap of medical and penal professionals and ideas in creating English drug policy. 
Here, we suggest that there still is, at the core of English drug policy making, a ‘medico-
penal policy constellation’. Members of this constellation are able to assert their shared 
interests and preferences, despite continuing challenges from ideas and actors in other 
policy constellations. 
 
Notes on method, data, ethics and terminology 
 
We focus on England, rather than the UK more broadly. While the Misuse of Drugs Act 
1971 applies across the UK, each of its four countries has its own drug strategy and 
treatment systems. These have diverged over time, especially since 2008 (Lloyd, 2009). 
The two chosen policy debates - on decriminalisation and recovery - have engaged the 
interest of a wide range of actors within and around the drug policy process. They offer 
good opportunities to observe how it works, especially as they provide a contrast in 
exemplifying continuity (the continued criminalisation of possession) and change (the 
shift to recovery in drug treatment). 
 
Habermas’ work on normativity has been criticised for focusing on procedures of 
normative contestation, rather than on the substantive content of normative 
preferences (Boudin, 2013; Sayer, 2011). To address this, we use the empirical work of 
Haidt and his colleagues, who have shown that people with conservative political 
orientations tend to hold normative beliefs that focus on purity/sanctity, social 
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conformity and respect for authority (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). 1 We also note 
that these normative beliefs are congruent with upholding the legitimacy and 
reproducing the structurally favoured positions of social groups who have the power to 
define what is ‘pure’, who is conforming, and who holds authority.  
 
We understand individuals’ beliefs as driven by normative and moral preferences, as 
well as by political and economic self-interest. Policy is as much about the promotion of 
normative values as it is about the allocation of resources (Barton & Johns, 2013; 
Easton, 1953; Hill, 2009).  
 
We employed three methods of data collection: long-term participant observation; 
qualitative interviews; and documentary analysis. Both authors have been active in 
English policy debates over a period that is longer than is usual for short-term, time-
limited, ethnographic studies. Alex Stevens has worked in the field of drug policy since 
1991, including a stint working in a policy unit at the highest levels of the civil service 
(Stevens, 2011b). He has been a member of the UK Advisory Council on the Misuse of 
Drugs* (ACMD) since 2014.2 Giulia Zampini worked with Transform Drug Policy 
Foundation* in 2009/10, and the Bristol Drugs Project in 2010/11. This deep 
immersion in the world of English drug policy has enabled the authors to develop a rich, 
ethnographic understanding of the social world of English drug policy in which we have 
participated.  It gives us a particular viewpoint of this social world. We have, for 
example, worked more closely with civil servants and drug policy reform organisations 
than with the police or conservative think tanks. A different view of English drug policy 
constellations might emerge from such different viewpoints (Hammersley & Atkinson, 
2007). 
 
The analysis is supplemented by data from qualitative interviews, which were carried 
out as part of a PhD project by Zampini (2016) on the use of evidence in drug and 
prostitution policy in the UK and Australia. Interviewees (n=15 in UK drug policy) were 
                                                          
1 This is not to say that we accept Haidt’s evolutionary psychological explanation for these moral 
preferences. The sociological analysis of overlapping preferences in England for moral purity and its 
imposition on the community at large has deep sociological roots (MacKinnon, 1993; Weber, 1920) 
2 The views expressed in this article do not reflect those of the ACMD. No specific information or data that 
is available to members of the ACMD but not the public is used in this article. 
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selected on the basis of their involvement in drug policy making. They belong to 
different and at times overlapping categories, including politicians, civil servants, 
researchers, advocates and knowledge-brokers. Some interviewees had more than one 
role, as noted next to their quotes. Their personal characteristics reflected the 
dominance of white, middle-class, middle-aged men in English drug policy discussions. 
Thirteen of them were men. The youngest interviewee was in his late 30s. All were of 
white ethnicity. None has publicly identified themself as a user of illicit drugs.  The 
absence of publicly self-declared active drug users from our sample reflects the 
exclusion of active drug users from influential positions in English drug policy debates. 
The interviews focused on the use of evidence in policy, opening the door to broad 
discussion of policy debates, of which decriminalisation and recovery were prominent 
features.   
 
The article also draws on analysis of documents that have been published in the field of 
English drug policy since 2000.  Documents are the ’primary medium’ of policy work 
(Budd, Charles, & Paton, 2006:1).  Analysis of their production, content and deployment 
can provide useful insights into the social world in which they circulate (Prior, 2003). 
Selection of the documents that are analysed and cited here was informed by the 
participant observation and the interviews. The cited documents are those that seemed 
– to us, our interviewees and other researchers (e.g. Lancaster, Duke, & Ritter, 2015; 
MacGregor, 2017) – to be particularly interesting for the ways that they were 
constructed and used (or, in some cases, not used).  
 
Our analysis of these data involved reading, re-reading, coding and re-coding field notes, 
interview transcripts and documents with the aim of identifying how the observed 
actions and discourses work in connecting together the themes that they contain. In this 
way, our analysis is similar to the ‘argumentative analysis’ proposed by Thompson 
(1990) for the study of forms of symbolic communication which support or challenge 
inequalities in power. Thompson argues that this puts into practice Habermasian 
concepts by making visible the common elements in this communication, and how they 
are organised into arguments that include or exclude certain people and ideas.  
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Permission was given for the interviews by the ethics committee of the University of 
Kent. No ethical approval was sought for the long-term participant observation that 
informs this article. It would not be practical to seek ethical approval for every 
observation of action in the field over a period of decades. Nor would it be ethical to 
refuse to use this information for the purposes of developing knowledge in the field, 
simply because there has been no formal review of the processes of information 
gathering. We attempt to minimise the possibility of harm to people whose activities we 
have observed by not compromising their anonymity; any information given in this 
article that identifies individuals is already in the public domain. 
 
For this article, we are happy to adopt the definition given by both Jenkins (1978, p. 15) 
and Hill (2009) of policy as ‘a set of interrelated decisions… concerning the selection of 
goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation’.  We focus on policy 
decisions as outcomes of processes of ‘structured interaction’ (Colebatch, 2009) that are 
not just written in documents, but enacted in practice (Houborg & Bjerge, 2017). By 
‘drug’, we refer to those substances that are controlled under the UN Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs and its successor conventions (Bewley-Taylor, 2012). We do not 
attempt evaluation of the impact of these policy decisions on drug use, harms and 
benefits in this article. Rather, we are interested in the processes and actions which 
shape these decisions. 
 
Policy constellations in the decriminalisation debate 
 
In her historical work, Berridge (2013) describes the development of the ‘medico-penal 
framework’, which brought together medical and law enforcement professionals around 
the idea that legal coercion was needed in order to protect public health from the 
dangers of drugs. Challenges to this viewpoint, which emanated in the 1960s from the 
‘welfare branch of the alternative society’ (e.g.. organisations such as Release* and the 
Soma Research Association* [Mold, 2006]), were not effective in ending the 
criminalisation of possession. The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (MDA) still includes 
possession as a criminal offence, despite ongoing criticisms and challenges. 
Professionals from both medical and law enforcement institutions have continued to 
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support this stance. This includes people who are concerned with both individual and 
public health, such as doctors, psychiatrists and civil servants in the Department of 
Health. However, the more powerful supporters of criminalisation have come from the 
institutions that focus on social control; Home Office ministers and civil servants, as 
well as the police. In contrast, the principal targets of criminalisation have always been 
people who could be constructed as ‘outsiders’ to the mainstream of English society 
(Mills, 2013). The burdens of criminalisation – in the form of arrests, penal sanctions 
and criminal records – continue to fall most heavily on young people of black and 
minority ethnic origin (Stevens, 2011c), who are also largely excluded from drug policy 
discussions and decision-making. 
 
In 2000, the MDA was examined by an expert group brought together by the Police 
Foundation*, with Ruth Runciman3 in the chair (Independent Inquiry into the Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1971, 2000). Among other things, it recommended that cannabis be moved 
out of class B of the MDA. There followed a well-documented “cannabis kerfuffle” 
(Lloyd, 2008; Monaghan, 2008; Shiner, 2015; Stevens, 2011c). As Home Secretary, 
David Blunkett moved the drug down to class C. In 2009, his successor Jacqui Smith 
moved it back to class B. This latter reclassification reflected the conservative views of 
the Centre for Social Justice* (Gyngell, 2007) more closely than the reforms proposed by 
the Police Foundation, or the recommendations of the ACMD (2002, 2005, 2008). 
Further attempts to change the government’s mind (e.g. by the UK Drug Policy 
Commission* [UKDPC], again chaired by Ruth Runciman) have had little impact. In 
2017, the law on cannabis possession is the same as was enacted in 1971. The MDA still 
formally criminalises the possessors of a wide range of psychoactive substances. It is 
still being justified on the basis that criminalisation sends powerful signals to potential 
users. This is a common thread in political discussion of cannabis, from the time when 
James Callaghan was Home Secretary in the late 1960s (Oakley, 2012), through the New 
Labour era (Stevens, 2017) to the present position of the Home Office (see below). Such 
justification rests on the normative role of the law to express certain moral principles 
(Habermas, 1986); in this case, norms of purity/sanctity, and of respect for authority 
                                                          
3 Runciman had been a prominent member of the ACMD, as well as being involved with other bodies 
concerned with public health. 
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(Haidt, 2012). The burdens of enforcing these norms still fall most heavily on relatively 
powerless social groups. 
 
As suggested above, despite the continuity of the MDA, there is active contestation 
about criminalisation. There have been a series of individuals and organisations 
involved in efforts to reduce or eliminate the criminalisation of drug users. These 
groups have been as diverse in their membership and institutional aims as the Soma 
Research Association of the 1960s, the Police Foundation in 2000, Transform and the 
Beckley Foundation* from the 2000s onwards and – more recently – the UKDPC, 
Volteface* and both the Faculty* and the Royal Society of Public Health* (2016), with 
Release being the only organisation to maintain this position from the 1960s onwards. 
These organisations have frequently worked alongside each other in arguing for reform; 
acting to encourage debate and to disseminate evidence on the harms of existing 
policies and the benefits of possible alternatives (e.g. Rolles, 2009; Rolles et al., 2016; 
Rosmarin & Eastwood, 2012; UKDPC, 2012). However, the actions of this constellation 
have not resulted in its members’ desired policy change. 
 
The opponents of decriminalisation have repeatedly succeeded in preventing change 
to the law. These include a wide range of actors, both within and outside the state, but 
it is generally perceived within the field (as noted by several of our interviewees) that 
the Home Office is the most powerful supporter of the criminalising status quo. It is to 
the Home Office that journalists turn for quotes on any new decriminalising initiative. 
They are repeatedly given the same line: 
 
Drugs are illegal where there is scientific and medical evidence that they are 
harmful to health and society. We must prevent drug use in our communities and 
help dependent individuals to recover, while ensuring our drugs laws are 
enforced. (Home Office, cited by Connolly, 2016) 
 
The same Home Office positon has been stated many times in response to reforming 
initiatives and political challenges (BBC, 2016a, 2016b; The Guardian, 2016; Home 
Office, 2013). 
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Occasionally, cracks appear in the Home Office position. Under the Conservative/Liberal 
Democrat coalition government of 2010-2015, the junior minister responsible for drug 
policy was a Liberal Democrat. In 2014, the job was held by Norman Baker.4 He 
commissioned a report that compared the content and effects of drug policy in several 
countries (Home Office, 2014). The report was not supportive of the usual Home Office 
line that it is necessary to enforce the laws on possession in order to reduce the harms 
of drugs. It found no link between the severity of law enforcement in a country and its 
levels of drug use and related harm. After resigning from his post, Baker reported that 
publication of this report had been ‘blocked’ by ‘Conservative colleagues’, including then 
Home Secretary Theresa May. He also claimed that draft versions of the report included 
recommendations in favour of a ‘Portuguese model’ of decriminalisation, but that these 
were removed before publication (BBC, 2014). In the end, the power of the Home 
Secretary prevailed; a clear example of strategic, purposive action that excluded certain 
ideas from the public argument, and so distorted rational deliberation. 
 
In contrast to the constellation of actors that support decriminalisation, the Home Office 
– and the Home Secretary in particular - stand in a hierarchical position of power in 
relation to other agencies. The Home Office controls the funding of police services and 
sets the policy environment within which they work. Within the UK government, the 
Home Office take the formal lead in drug policy coordination, so its acquiescence – at 
least – is required for any other central government policy on drugs. As one interviewee 
put it: 
 
The Home Secretary has a huge influence […] the priority that they give to drugs, 
their attitude to evidence; their general perspective on how the drugs issue should 
be managed is very influential.  And the junior ministers […] they do influence as 
well because they also have to make the case to the Home Secretary […] although 
the Home Secretary undoubtedly is the final arbiter of what goes on (Researcher/ 
Knowledge Broker/ Civil Servant 13) 
 
                                                          
4 The Liberal Democrats are persuaded that decriminalisation is the way forward, and have adopted this 
as an official party line, contrary to both the Conservative and Labour parties. It is also relevant to note 
that Liberal Democrats have rarely been part of government, and more often part of the opposition. They 
are thus more frequently ‘outsiders’ to the government executive.  
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Civil servants take their lead from ministers in ‘making policy happen’ (Maybin, 2015: 
288). If the Home Secretary wishes to make or refuse a change in English drug policy, 
she has the constitutional authority and the political power to do so; in other words, 
government matters (Zampini, 2014).  MacGregor (2016) calls this ‘the rather obvious 
but crucial importance of political power’. It is important to remember that political 
power is itself structured through inequalities of class, race, gender and age (Mclellan, 
1995). The Home Office is led by individuals who have benefited from social inequality. 
In contrast to supporters of decriminalisation, they have the power to make policy 
through powerful orders rather than complex and contingent negotiation and 
persuasion. These decisions then reinforce the power of the Home Office and its leaders. 
 
Nevertheless, for their decisions to be agreed and implemented, Home Office ministers 
need to ensure that they have legitimacy among those in subordinate organisations and 
external agencies. So there is some room for negotiation and contestation. And there is 
some space for divergent practices to emerge. For example, both Durham and Bristol 
police services have set up schemes that divert drug possession offenders away from 
the criminal justice system. The charity The Loop* set up multi-agency safety testing of 
drugs at some dance music festivals in England in the summers of 2016 and 2017, with 
the support of local health and police services. However, these are examples of localised 
change in a national picture within which a dominant policy constellation – centred 
around the Home Office – has successfully prevented substantial policy change that has 
been advocated by a longstanding but fluid constellation of challengers and outsiders. 
The normative preference of members of the dominant constellation for moral purity 
and respect for authority coincides with their material interests in maintaining their 
access to power and resources. The burdens of continuing criminalisation fall largely 
upon young people and members of ethnic minorities who do not share these normative 
preferences or material interests.  
 
Policy constellations around recovery in drug treatment 
 
Another interesting strand of English drug policy is the debate over how to treat people 
who have become dependent on drugs, and especially heroin. This too has a long 
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history, dating back at least to the discussions over the treatment of heroin addiction 
that engaged the Rolleston committee in 1926 (Berridge, 1999). More recently, the 
debate has expressed itself in the conflict between ‘harm reductionists’ and 
‘abstentionists’ over the relative roles of opioid substitution therapy (OST) and recovery 
in specialist drug treatment (Ashton, 2008; Berridge, 2012; Hickman, Vickerman, 
Robertson, Macleod, & Strang, 2011; Lancaster et al., 2015; Monaghan & Yeomans, 
2015; Roy & Buchanan, 2016; Stevens, 2011d).  
 
The immediate backdrop to this revived antagonism was the substantial expansion in 
OST under the Labour government of 1997 to 2010. By the year 2006/7, there were 
over 200,000 people in ‘structured drug treatment’, with 74 per cent of them receiving 
OST. The BBC reported that a very small portion (less than 4 per cent) was leaving 
treatment ‘free of drugs’ (M. Easton, 2008).   
 
the NTA [National Treatment Agency*] presented some treatment figures that 
Mark Easton from the BBC pulled apart […] the government got a roasting in the 
papers […] it opened up a whole big hoo-ha in the sector about abstinence versus 
harm reduction, and that rumbled on until you had the current Tory bit of the 
coalition in shadow, and Ian Duncan Smith in particular, looking at the Centre for 
Social Justice, linked into welfare reform (Knowledge Broker 12) 
 
This fed into debates that had already been escalating about what the aim of treatment 
should be: to protect people’s health; to prevent offending; or to help people recover by 
fulfilling their wishes to become abstinent (Best, 2009; McKeganey, Morris, Neale, & 
Robertson, 2004). The UK and Scottish drug strategies that were published in 2008 
emphasised the need to support such recovery (Lloyd, 2009). In England, the push for 
recovery accelerated after the election of the coalition government in 2010, as could be 
seen in the national drug strategy published that year (Stevens, 2011d) and in think 
tank reports such as the Centre for Policy Studies*’ Breaking the Habit (Gyngell, 2011). 
In 2012, an ‘inter-ministerial’ report called Putting Full Recovery First was published 
(Inter-Ministerial Group on Drugs, 2012).  As argument, this ‘recovery roadmap’ sought 
to include a morally pure vision of abstinent recovery – and to exclude OST – as the 
dominant form of drug treatment. It stated that drug treatment agencies would be paid 
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only for delivering such ‘full recovery’. This was defined as abstinence from all illicit and 
substitute drugs. This was a direct contrast to the UKDPC’s earlier (2008) attempt to 
create a ‘consensus’ definition of recovery, which included controlled use of drugs. The 
inter-ministerial document promised that the government would ‘maximise access to 
abstinence-based’ treatment by reducing the amount of time that people would be 
prescribed methadone. It envisaged a prominent role in the management of drug 
treatment for ‘strategic recovery champions’; people who had succeeded in recovering 
from drug addiction themselves and could thus lead other drug users along the steps to 
sobriety.  
 
In this policy document, the triumph of recovery and of the conservative morality 
expressed through the abstinent purity/sanctity sentiment held by many of its 
advocates (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009) was complete. The move to recovery was 
seen in the field as a specifically moral endeavour. As one interviewee put it, 
 
by critiquing maintenance prescribing, they tick moral boxes for the authoritarian 
and religious right (Civil Servant 9). 
 
 
In the debate around recovery, we see the activity of several prominent ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’, including social conservatives associated with the Centres for Social 
Policy and Social Justice. They, in contrast to actors who support decriminalisation, 
were able to have a greater influence on policy. One of our interviewees echoed 
Kingdon’s (1995) notion of the need for policy windows to be exploited by policy 
entrepreneurs: 
 
a window opens […] you have to be ready to go in there. Sometimes I think those of 
the research fraternity and community are not responsive enough, are not ready 
enough to be able to utilize those windows. (Knowledge Broker 10) 
 
The contrasting examples of the decriminalisation and recovery debates suggests that 
the ability to be responsive and ready to exploit policy windows will depend on an 
actor’s position within a constellation of connections, interests and resources. Some will 
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find it easier than others to identify and take up such opportunities. Both the Centre for 
Policy Studies and the Centre for Social Justice promoted funding recovery instead of 
harm reduction. The former has been influential on Conservative party policy since the 
Thatcher era. The latter was founded by Iain Duncan Smith in 2004 after he was 
deposed as leader of the Conservative opposition. It developed several of the ideas that 
he later took into government as a minister. Kathy Gyngell (2007, 2011) wrote reports 
on drug policy for both think tanks. Senior staff members became close advisers to 
government ministers from 2010. For example, Philippa Stroud was a co-founder of the 
Centre for Social Justice. She became a special adviser to both the Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions (Iain Duncan Smith) and the Prime Minister (David Cameron) on 
social justice. She was ennobled in 2015 and returned to running the Centre for Social 
Justice. Christian Guy also served as both an adviser to David Cameron and Chief 
Executive of the Centre for Social Justice. Their work was informed by advocates for 
recovery in the field of drug treatment, including Noreen Oliver and the Recovery Group 
UK* (Duke, Herring, Thickett, & Thom, 2013). They also have close contacts with senior 
media figures. In the words of one interviewee, 
that’s a strong strand of Tory thinking that coalesced around the Centre for Social 
Justice. (Civil Servant 9) 
 
The board of the Centre for Policy Studies includes both Fraser Nelson, editor of The 
Spectator magazine, and the Viscountess Rothermere, widow of the proprietor of the 
Daily Mail. These are both highly influential conservative organs in the UK; the former 
among the Westminster-based political world, and the latter with a mass audience of 
newspaper and online readers. They bring what Habermas (2006) calls ‘media power’ 
into play by enabling some policy actors to gain differential access to political power 
through the media. 
 
While the constellation of actors favouring recovery was more powerful than that 
favouring decriminalisation, it also faced opposition from another constellation that is 
well established within English drug policy. This consisted of experts, academics and 
officials in and around the National Treatment Agency* (NTA) and the Department of 
Health (including the ACMD and the UKDPC) that had – between them – developed the 
prevailing approach to drug treatment. They were able to maintain its emphasis on 
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‘evidence-based’ treatment, including OST. The national drug strategy of 2010 included 
an emphasis on recovery, but also recognition that OST – and even heroin-assisted 
treatment – have a legitimate and valuable role in the drug treatment system. The 
efforts of members of this medically focused constellation are visible through the 
various reports they have produced in response to governmental requests to review the 
evidence on how drug treatment can contribute to recovery (ACMD, 2012a, 2015; 
Recovery Orientated Drug Treatment Expert Group, 2012). Other reports from expert 
groups have also endorsed the continuing value of harm reduction services, especially 
in the light of increases in opioid-related deaths over recent years (ACMD, 2012b, 2016; 
SDF, 2016). In accord with their recommendations that the medical intervention of OST 
should remain a central component of drug treatment, the inter-ministerial report on 
‘full recovery’ was never fully implemented. The number of people in OST did not 
rapidly decline (PHE, 2015). Residential, abstinence-based services did not see a boost 
in income or referrals (Drugscope, 2015). There have been reports of changes within 
drug treatment services, with a shift away from harm reduction towards the 
achievement of ‘drug-free exits’ from treatment (Dennis, 2016; Floodgate, 2016). And 
funding for all forms of drug treatment has been cut (ACMD, 2016). But OST continues 
to be the predominant treatment modality for people who have problems with heroin 
(Clinical Guidelines on Drug Misuse and Dependence Update 2017; Independent Expert 
Working Group, 2017; Independent Expert Working Group, 2016). Recovery has been 
absorbed into pre-existing treatment practices, through the hybrid concept of ‘recovery-
oriented’ OST (Recovery Orientated Drug Treatment Expert Group, 2012). In relabelling 
OST as recovery-oriented, some professionals have been able to keep their positions of 
influence over drug treatment policy. They have absorbed the challenge of recovery into 
existing practices in ways that maintain their positions of influence and reflect their 
belief in the role of medical intervention to support public health. 
 
Our interviewees focused on the actions of civil servants, academics and politicians in 
their accounts of how drug policy decisions are made, with close to no references to the 
role of drug users themselves. This triangulates well with our observation of their 
relative absence from influential drug policy discussions, and their presence in drug 
policy documents as objects, rather than creators or authors of policy. It also fits well 
with the theoretical assumption that access to influential discussions tends to be limited 
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to people who share structurally favoured social positions and norms. People who 
themselves have problems with drugs continue to be excluded - as Lancaster (2016) 
also notes - from direct participation in drug policy debates. They have little influence 
on the development of drug treatment policy. Rapid increases in deaths among this 
group have not, so far, led to substantial changes to the recovery-oriented treatment 
approach. The people who suffer problems and deaths from drug use come 
disproportionately from socio-economically deprived, working class areas in the 
deindustrialised parts of the UK (ACMD, 2016; Pearson, 1987). They are outsiders 
because of both their disadvantaged structural positions, and also their participation in 
normatively stigmatised, scapegoated patterns of consumption. 
 
Some people and connections are more powerful than others. They use this power as 
‘active participants in the shaping of the negotiated order of which they are part’ 
(Degeling & Colebatch, 1984). The relative power they bring to policy debates is highly 
influenced by the structural positions of these actors, and the structured nature of the 
connections between them. Connections that work for one area of policy (e.g. the 
Centres for Policy Studies and Social Justice’s connections to the Conservative Party for 
economic and social policy) are more likely to also work for others (e.g. the shift to 
recovery in drug policy). People who have advantages of class, race, gender and age are 
much more likely to occupy such positions and to have such connections. So while 
policy entrepreneurship and the availability of ‘policy windows’ (Kingdon, 1995) are 
important in the description of English drug policy, we also need to pay attention to 
structured action within and between constellations of people who share similar values 
and interests across policy areas. 
 
In the debate on recovery, we see a messy process of unintended compromises between 
influential people who may have different ‘core beliefs’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 
1993). For example, there may be competition between the ‘moral foundations’ 
(Graham et al., 2009) of ‘care’ and ‘sanctity’. But even with some conflict in underlying 
beliefs, a policy outcome can emerge (e.g. recovery oriented OST) that incorporates 
beliefs held by powerful actors on both sides of the debate and also satisfies their 
material interest by maintaining their access to power and resources.  
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Discussion: English drug policy constellations and the explanation of policy 
decisions 
 
While pluralist accounts of policy-making focus on self-interestedly rational 
competition and exchange between interest groups, the focus of the Habermasian 
approach is on communicatively rational deliberation, and its distortion through 
strategic action and ‘social power’.  In both of the debates we describe, we observe the 
operation of policy constellations whose members bring different structural positions, 
various material interests, and diverging moral preferences into drug policy 
discussions. The concepts of decriminalisation and recovery both have normative as 
well as material aspects. Both involved a challenge to the status quo of policy. The 
challenge of recovery had a greater impact than that of decriminalisation. This does not 
appear to be because the evidence for a shift to ‘full’ recovery is stronger than that for 
the decriminalisation of drug possession. Rather, the constellation that supported 
recovery included more structurally favoured people, who had more direct access to the 
most influential actors.  In both cases, the resulting policy decisions enable these actors 
to maintain their positions of relative power.  
 
These analyses show us that English drug policy-making involves negotiation between 
actors who are connected in a distinguishable policy community, as suggested by some 
pluralist approaches (Kingdon, 1984; Rhodes, 1990; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). 
However, we argue that we need to pay more attention to the role of socially structured 
imbalances of power of the type that Habermas describes if we are to understand the 
outcomes of these processes of normative and discursive contestation. But our 
argument is not just that power is unequally distributed, and so the policy game is 
rigged in favour of some groups over others. It is also a feature of the Habermasian 
approach to focus on the way in which actors enter into communicative processes that 
have the appearance of rational deliberation (e.g. policy arguments, use of research 
papers, expert committees). But the deliberative potential of these communicative 
processes is systematically short-circuited through the strategic deployment of socially 
structured power to exclude some people and ideas from the policy debate. 
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Communication within and between constellations is socially structured. The ability of 
actors to join and have influence within policy constellations is conditioned by the level 
of social power they possess (Habermas, 2006: 418). Habermas sees this as a form of 
power ‘that depends on the status one occupies in a stratified society’. In England, that 
stratification includes dimensions of class, race, gender and age. Social power includes 
‘economic power’ but also the advantages (or disadvantages) conferred by different 
levels of ‘cultural capital’ (Ibid). Some groups in society are differentially excluded from 
high social status, from wealth and economic capital, and from socially validated forms 
of cultural capital. This includes members of black and minority ethnic groups. They are 
disproportionately targeted by drug law enforcement (Eastwood, Shiner, & Bear, 2013; 
Stevens, 2011c), and are also under-represented in groups that take drug policy 
decisions. Similarly, women disproportionately lack social power and also face specific 
harms from drug policies (Malinowska-Sempruch & Rychkova, 2016). Despite the 
presence of some women at the highest levels of government, they are still under-
represented among senior civil servants and in Parliament. The 2010 drug strategy paid 
little attention to the gendered nature of drug-related harms (Wincup, 2016). People 
under 25 are the most likely to be users of legally controlled substances (Lader, 2015), 
but they are rarely given any voice at all in drug policy debates. The people who are 
most likely to die through drug use or be imprisoned for drug offences are from the 
working class (ACMD, 1998, 2016). But working class accents are only rarely heard in 
drug policy discussions within Whitehall. Rather, the people who have the most severe 
problems with drugs have been denigrated as an ‘underclass’ (Monaghan & Yeomans, 
2016) of ‘high harm causing users’ (PMSU, 2007). These structured inequalities 
influence who will become – in Gamson’s (1975) terms –an ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ of the 
policy discussion. As Habermas (2006: 421) argues, ‘social deprivation and cultural 
exclusion’ are major blockages to the inclusion of some people, their interests and their 
preferences in policy deliberation. 
 
The cumulative effect of these intersecting axes of inequality is exemplified by the 
authors of this article. Stevens is a white British, privately educated man in his 50s. He is 
regularly invited to discuss drug policy with politicians and civil servants. Such 
invitations are not extended to Zampini, who is a foreign-born, state-educated woman 
in her early 30s.  
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These structural features are not external to the policy network (as Compston [2009] 
suggests), but central to how it emerges and operates. Actors with different levels of 
social power have different degrees of connection, access and influence.  The political 
and financial mass of the Home Office and the police services it funds gives them weight 
in policy debates that much smaller organisations, like Transform and UKDPC, have 
been unable to match. But some small organisations, like the Centres for Policy Studies 
and for Social Justice, are able to amplify their influence through political affinities and 
close, socially structured connections to more powerful actors. 
 
Members of these constellations do not need to rely on ‘coordinated activity’, which 
Sabatier (1988) includes as a defining feature of ‘advocacy coalitions’. We take 
coordinated activity to imply that there is some centrally organised planning of joint 
actions towards agreed policy decisions.  We did not observe such coordinated activity 
in the two policy debates covered in this article. Rather, we see collaboration within 
policy constellations as a form of ‘structuration’ (Giddens, 1984) of social action. As 
Colebatch (2009) suggests, policy actors do not always need to jointly plan their actions 
towards a shared goal. When they share structural positions, normative preferences and 
material interests, independent actions taken on their own initiative will tend to work 
towards the institutionalisation of the same policy decisions. They will also tend to 
create connections of mutual recognition and support, and so will create policy 
constellations.  
 
Successes in such strategic action will feed forward to shape the opportunities for these 
and other actors to influence future decisions. This process can reproduce longstanding 
inequalities in access and power, without the need for active coordination to 
consolidate favoured positions or exclude challenging groups and ideas.  
 
Insert Figure 1 (illustration of English drug policy constellations) about here 
 
Given the development of policy constellations over time, their nature as patterns of 
connections which may appear different from different standpoints, and the difficulty of 
showing deep, structural patterns in two dimensions, we hesitate to provide a fixed, 
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two-dimensional representation of English drug policy constellations. But visualisation 
may help explain their operation. Figure 1 illustrates English drug policy constellations 
as they have worked in recent debates over decriminalisation and recovery. The cast of 
characters displayed spans Habermas’ (2006: 416) list of ‘actors who make their 
appearance on the virtual stage of an established public sphere’: politicians; journalists; 
lobbyists; advocates; experts; and moral entrepreneurs.  The diagram shows that these 
actors can be grouped together given their relative commitment to moral foundations 
on a spectrum between liberal and conservative positions (Graham et al., 2009). Those 
on the right of the diagram support policies in line with the moral foundations of 
loyalty, respect for authority, and purity/sanctity (Haidt, 2012). In this sense, such 
moral foundations are related with a belief in social control; a deep core belief of the 
type that Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) describe in the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework. 5 Those on the left of the diagram are more likely to support policies that 
are in line with the moral foundations of liberty/oppression and care/harm. Liberty is 
salient for people who value individual freedom over obedience to authority. Care is 
salient for people who value compassion (or even love [Burris, 2004]) for the 
vulnerable and the avoidance of cruelty. Both these foundations tend to accompany the 
‘liberal’ rather than ‘conservative’ position in empirical studies of the moral foundations 
framework (Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012; Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015). 
Care can be seen as a moral foundation for a core belief in the value of public health 
interventions. 
 
At the centre of the diagram, there are powerful actors whose policy preferences tend to 
focus either on public health measures (such as OST) or social control measures (such 
as criminalisation of drug possession). The former group includes officials within the 
Department of Health and the NTA/Public Health England*, many members of the 
ACMD and several commissioners of the UKDPC. The latter group includes Home Office 
ministers and civil servants, as well as many (but not all) representatives of policing. 
The individuals within these influential organisations tend to come from groups that are 
favoured by structural inequalities and so have high levels of social power, being 
predominantly male, middle-aged and middle class. They are insiders. They have 
                                                          
5 The relationship between moral foundations and deep core beliefs is further discussed by Clara Musto’s 
thesis (forthcoming) on the political process leading to the legal regulation of cannabis in Uruguay. 
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established senior positions within public and state-sanctioned institutions (e.g. police 
services, government departments, universities). They can be expected to act in ways 
that favour the interests of their social groups. 
 
There is no necessary contradiction between public health and social control (Lupton, 
1995; Stevens, 2011c). Measures taken to protect health often include state 
interventions to limit individual freedom. The overlap between policies for public health 
and social control enables cooperation between agencies that are committed to the 
‘medico-penal framework’ that Berridge (2013) identifies. These actors are brought 
together in Figure 1 in the ‘medico-penal constellation’. It is between these actors that 
the most important negotiations take place for English drug policy decisions.  
 
Other actors, who are not themselves members of this central constellation, seek to 
influence it when they want to change English drug policy. On the side of social 
conservatism, we have observed actions by the Centre for Policy Studies and the Centre 
for Social Justice, with significant support in the media, to move drug policy in a more 
conservative direction. On the more liberal wing, Transform and Release (among 
others) continue to campaign to institutionalise greater respect for the individual 
liberties and rights of people who use drugs. These actors are outsiders to the medico-
penal constellation. On both sides of the diagram, they tend to be somewhat more 
socially diverse than the ‘medico-penal constellation’. The constellation that favours 
abstinence includes privileged right-wing think tank staff, but also some working class 
former drug users who are in recovery, and their family members.  The constellation 
that favours liberalisation includes some younger people and some active drug users, as 
well as middle-aged, apparently sober professionals. 
 
In trying to create influence, actors outside the medico-penal constellation create 
connections with politicians. Some advocates of abstinent recovery have created links 
(through the Centre for Social Justice) to the Conservative Party. Transform and Release 
have succeeded in creating links with the Liberal Democrats (Rolles et al., 2016), but 
such links became less powerful after the party left government in 2015.   
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All the actors in these constellations take account of the broad contexts within which 
they work. They operate within the framework of international law (as laid out in the 
UN drug conventions), and under the influence of other countries. An example is the 
effective pressure that the USA placed on the UK government in 1990 to restrict the OST 
and harm reduction services provided in the north-west of England by Dr John Marks 
(Dean, 1995; Shiner, 2013). More recently, we have seen attempts, by the Liberal 
Democrats, public health bodies and other actors, to import the Portuguese model of 
decriminalisation (Jones, 2017; Royal Society of Public Health, 2016). The arrows in 
Figure 1 run in both directions because English drug policy actors also seek to influence 
international law and other countries.  
 
Actors in English drug policy constellations must also win legitimacy and support from 
the media and the various publics whose opinions are considered by policy decision 
makers. This includes members of relevant professional groups, as well as the general 
public. The compliance of actors such as doctors and police officers is necessary in order 
to implement drug policy decisions (Houborg & Bjerge, 2017).  Each of the actors listed 
in Figure 1 has staff or colleagues responsible for press relations. Some actors have 
closer connections to journalists than others, as exemplified by the presence of right 
wing media figures on the board of the Centre for Policy Studies. Again, the arrows run 
in both directions as drug policy actors must respond to the agenda of the media, as well 
as trying to set it. 
 
On this diagram, we would place ourselves as being in the intersection between 
concerns for public health and individual freedom. We have personal connections with 
organisations named in both these sections of Figure 1. A different view of policy 
processes could emerge from different viewpoints. For example, one group of 
researchers (Lancaster et al., 2015) saw the UKDPC’s ‘consensus definition’ of recovery 
as an attempt to ‘responsibilise’ drug users for their own recovery by emphasising their 
choices over drug use, in line with neo-liberal ideas on individual responsibility for 
social welfare. We rather see the UKDPC document as a form of strategic action. It 
defended the practice of OST from the challenge it faced from the socially conservative 
policy constellation by including OST within recovery. In doing so, it defended the 
interests and normative positions of actors on the medical side of the constellation. This 
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was partially successful in repelling the threat to collective provision of health care to 
people who use drugs, in that publicly funded OST has not (yet) suffered the massively 
diminished fate intended for it by the Centre for Policy Studies. It is interesting that the 
UKDPC presented its definition as a ‘consensus’, thereby implying that it was the result 
of deliberative communication, not strategic action. It is through such processes of 
negotiation and contestation within and between policy constellations that policy 
decisions are produced. 
Conclusion: towards a critical theory of English drug policy outcomes 
 
This article uses the Habermasian concept of the policy constellation to provide both a 
description and an explanation of two recent aspects of English drug policy; the non-
implementation of decriminalisation; and the absorption of recovery into drug 
treatment policy. 
 
The description focuses on the relative inclusion and exclusion of certain actors and 
ideas from the process of decision-making.  This process is based on patterns of shared 
or conflicting material interests, overlapping or divergent moral preferences, and 
diverse structural positions. We have described these structured interactions as 
creating policy constellations of power and interest through which individual actors 
attempt to influence policy. The most influential is the medico-penal constellation, in 
which preferences for care and public health overlap with norms of authority and social 
control. Actors and organisations in the medico-penal constellation are able to influence 
policy both by engaging in rational, communicative action, and by systematically 
distorting such communication through strategic deployment of their power. Less 
powerful, but connected constellations include people who are more concerned with 
norms of social conservatism or individual liberty. As Habermas (1986) predicted, it is 
the norms held by the most powerful social actors which have been most influential in 
producing policy decisions. 
 
So the explanatory element of the analysis comes through the incorporation of both 
material interests and normative preferences, and of both individual agency and 
structured positions, to understand which decisions are most likely to emerge from 
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English drug policy processes. The high level of overall continuity observed in English 
drug policy can be explained by the continuing predominance of a constellation of 
actors whose social positions and power remain stable, even as the individual 
participants change. English drug policy is largely made by middle or upper class, 
middle-aged or older, white British professionals in the early 21st century, as it were in 
the early 20th.  They deploy their social power through collective but relatively 
uncoordinated action in policy constellations. Their action ensures that English drug 
policy continues to reflect their material interests and normative preferences, although 
not in a way that any individual actor might have intended, and certainly not in a form 
that would result from disinterested, purely rational, communicative or ‘evidence-
based’ deliberation.  
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